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Direct Employer Liability for Punitive
Damages
Sandra F Sperino*
In Punitive Damages, Due Process, and Employment Discrimination, Joseph
Seiner tackles the growing complexity of employment discrimination
punitive damages claims and provides a workable solution to a difficult
problem. Given the importance of punitive damages in shaping incentives to
bring discrimination suits, his contribution is valuable, especially in trying to
align recent constitutional punitive damages cases with the underlying
discrimination law.
This Essay begins by emphasizing the fundamental idea on which
Professor Seiner and I agree-that there should be little room for courts to
reduce punitive damages in federal employment discrimination cases based
on constitutional concerns about excessiveness. Title VII contains express
damages limitations that alleviate such concerns.
The Essay continues by discussing whether the Supreme Court's
decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker applies to federal discrimination
claims. In arguing that there is little need for courts to use due process limits
on punitive damages in federal discrimination cases, Professor Seiner draws
on the underlying rationales of Exxon. Part II demonstrates how invoking
Exxon is problematic because courts might use its reasoning to impose
unnecessary and inappropriate limits on punitive damages, even those that
fall within Title VII's modest damages cap.
Finally, this Essay supplements the multi-part test suggested by Professor
Seiner. Professor Seiner's model involves situations in which the employer is
being held vicariously liable for punitive damages. Part III argues that
employers also should face direct liability for punitive damages and provides
the contours for such analysis. Any punitive damages test that is centered on
expressed Supreme Court norms related to agency principles will necessarily
* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
t. This Essay does not address claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or state law.
Although the Essay focuses on claims under Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act
contains similar damages limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 1g81a(a)(1)-(2), (b)(I), (3) (2006). The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not provide for punitive damages for
discrimination claims. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006).
2. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008).
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be underinclusive as to possible punitive damages awards against employers.
To date, the Supreme Court has failed to fully explore how employers are
liable for their own intentional conduct rather than just derivatively liable
for the acts of their agents.
I. A REALISTIC VIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Many people and employers mistakenly believe that federal
discrimination cases produce massive punitive damages awards. While these
cases can create large expenses for employers, those costs are not primarily
related to punitive damages. Any call for limits on punitive damages in
federal cases must start by recognizing that juries award such damages in a
small percentage of cases and that the awards are typically modest.
Both Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") contain
a statutory cap on punitive damages. This cap not only applies to punitive
damages but also limits the combined amount of punitive and statutorily
defined compensatory damages that a plaintiff may recovers This limit
varies by the employer's size, and only the largest employers are potentially
liable for the maximum award of $300,000 in combined damages.4 This
number has not increased since 1991. Further, the trial judge is not allowed
to instruct the jury regarding the damages cap.s Therefore, in some federal
discrimination cases employers are held liable for less damages than a jury
found was warranted given the underlying conduct.S
A large body of research, including Professor Seiner's own, shows that it
is difficult for employment discrimination plaintiffs to prevail on summary
judgment motions, let alone at trial, and that the underlying awards only
include punitive damages in limited instances.' Even in those rare cases
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1), (3). These statutes exclude back pay and other
defined kinds of relief from the definition of compensatory damages. Id. § tg81a(b) (2). Thus,
"compensatory damages" under these statutes largely reflect awards for "future pecuniary losses,
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses." Id. § 1981a(b) (3).
4. See id.§ 1981a(b)(3).
5. Seeid. §i981a(c)(2).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
7. E.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Lmployment Discrimination Plailijfs
Fate in Federal Court, i J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL S"T). 429, 451-56 (2004); Ruth Colker, The
Ameicans with Disabilities Act: A Wind/all fr Deendant, 34 HARx. C.R.-C.L. L. Rx. 99, to8
(iggg) (reporting that either through dismissal or verdicts in ADA cases "[d]efendants
prevailed in 448 of 4 7 5 cases (94%) at the trial court level and in 376 of 448 instances (84%)
in which plaintiffs appealed these adverse judgments"); Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson,
Rigls Realized? An ELmpirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Lilliolion as a Claiming Sysline,
005 Wis. L. RiEV. 663, 69; Joseph A. Seiner, The Failue o Punitwe Damages in Employment
Discriminalion Cases: A Call fin Change, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 735, 741 (2oo8) (finding that
punitive damages were awarded in only 18% of Title VII cases that resulted in a federal jury
trial); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discritnination Cases So lard To Win?, 61 LA. L. RiEV.
25
SIOWA LAWREVIEWBULLETIN
when an employer faces the maximum possible award under the federal
discrimination statutes, the statute explicitly notifies the employer of the
potential liability it faces. There is little concern about the "stark
unpredictability of punitive awards"8 or the defendant's lack of knowledge of
the potential award. The substantive standard for permitting punitive
damages,i the availability of a defense for the employer to avoid liabilityo
and the strong public policy against workplace discrimination assure the
appropriateness of punitive damages. Given these realities, constitutional
concerns about notice and fairness regarding punitive damages should
rarely arise in the federal context."
Professor Seiner and I agree on this fundamental point. Court limits on
punitive damages in federal employment discrimination cases should revolve
more around the underlying substantive doctrine than around
constitutional concerns about excessiveness. This point deserves reiterating
because the courts have had a difficult time applying the Supreme Court's
due process jurisprudence to employment cases, making numerous errors as
they try to navigate the statutes' complex remedies regimes and the
constitutional tests.'
Additionally, it is important that courts view federal employment
discrimination liability realistically. If courts believe that such remedies are
typically modest, it is unlikely that they will feel the need to intervene injury
decisions regarding punitive damages. Given the malleability of the three-
prong test the Supreme Court developed to evaluate constitutional due
process, it appears that in some cases the courts are not policing
constitutional bounds, but rather imposing the judge's own personal
viewpoint about appropriate liability. Such meddling is especially
inappropriate in employment discrimination cases.,,
555, 556 (2oo1); Catherine M. Sharkey, Disecing Damages: An Empiimcal Lxploration o/ Sexual
Harassment Awards, 3J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL ST11). 1, 2-3 (2006).
8. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 499 (2008).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006) (providing that a party may prevail on punitive
damages only if it establishes that the defendant engaged in discriminatory practices with
"malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
individual").
10. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 5 27 U.S. 526, 544 (1999).
11. Some federal employment discrimination cases may result in a high ratio of punitive
damages to other kinds of damages. Part II addresses why these claims should not typically draw
constitutional scrutiny. See infra Part II. The author is not arguing that constitutional concerns
would be inappropriate in claims brought under state law or pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Section 198 1 does not contain a damages cap; nor do many state law claims.
12. Sandra Sperino, The New Calculus of Punitive Damages far Employment DiciiniihJatlon
Cases, 62 OKIA. L. REV. 701 (2010) (describing mistakes).
13. Seegenerally Sandra Sperino, judicialPreemption ( Puniive Damages, 78 U. CIN. L. REV.
227 (2009).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN ExxoN SHOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO
FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
In creating a structure for federal punitive damages inquiries, Professor
Seiner argues that no constitutional excessiveness test is needed because the
federal discrimination statutes already address such concerns. He relies on
the Supreme Court's decision in Exxon for this general proposition. This
Part highlights the subtlety of this argument, so that future readers do not
misunderstand it as an embrace of Exxon, which is otherwise problematic.
In Exxon, the Supreme Court held that under the particular facts of the
case, the Court had the authority to impose a one-to-one ratio of
compensatory to punitive damages.14 The Court decided the issue under
maritime law, which it characterized as falling "within a federal court's
jurisdiction to decide in the manner of a common law court."u, Indeed, in
Exxon, the Court rejected an argument that the Clean Water Act applied to
preempt maritime damages.1b Thus, in Exxon, the Court was considering
whether it had the power to substantively limit punitive damages claims
prior to applying a constitutional analysis.:
When courts are considering punitive damages under federal
employment discrimination law, they are not acting within common law
authority. Rather, their appropriate role, at least where an explicit statutory
provision is present, is to interpret the applicable provision and not to create
law based on their own preferences. This is different than maritime law,
where the courts play a large role in constructing remedies. In federal
employment discrimination cases, the availability of remedies is established
by statute. To the extent Exxon provides that courts can impose a one-to-one
ratio on damages, this holding is not precedent with respect to federal
employment discrimination law.
While Exxon is not precedent, the danger of associating the case with
employment discrimination law is that courts might generally rely on it for
persuasive reasoning. Exxon is generally skeptical of cases where the
compensatory to punitive damages exceed a one-to-one ratio. It is plausible
that courts will rely on this general skepticism when they consider the range
of permissible liability under statutes.
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Supreme Court set forward a
three-part test for determining whether punitive damages are excessive.1S
14. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 513 (2008).
15. Id. at 489-90.
16. Id. at 489.
17. Id. at 502 ("Our review of punitive damages today, then, considers not their
intersection with the Constitution, but the desirability of regulating them as a common law
remedy for which responsibility lies with this Court as a source ofjudge-made law in the absence
of statute.").
18. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574-75 (1996) (holding that courts
should consider the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct, the disparity
27
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The Court also has repeatedly reiterated that "few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, ... will satisfy due
process."") The Court also has suggested that an award of more than four
times the amount of compensatory damages would be close to the line of
impropriety in many cases.2 0 It is not clear from these standards whether
judges should view the excessiveness inquiry as policing the outward limits of
potential liability or whether it requires judges to place each case within a
spectrum of liability based on the case's own individual facts.2I
The following example illustrates the tension. Assume a plaintiff
prevails on a sexual harassment case under Title VII, and the jury awards
punitive damages of $3oo,ooo against the large employer. Ajudge who views
the constitutional inquiry as policing the outward bounds of liability would
likely uphold the verdict. However, a judge that views the inquiry as
requiring her to place punitive damages within a spectrum may examine
other sexual harassment verdicts to determine whether the verdict is in line
with comparable cases. The judge may decide to reduce punitive damages if
otherjuries have awarded fewer punitive damages in similar factual contexts.
It is in these latter cases where Exxon's reasoning may encourage courts
to reduce damages to reflect the Supreme Court's preferred 1:i ratio of
compensatory to punitive damages. However, employment discrimination
cases present radically different factual scenarios than the Court considered
in Exxon. It is important to highlight that Exxon did not apply a blanket 1:1
ratio in all maritime cases. Rather, it imposed the limit on cases of "this
type," meaning the kind of facts underlying Exxon.22
In Exxon, the Court noted that the underlying conduct did not
demonstrate "exceptional blameworthiness" in that there was no intentional
between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff, and the difference between the
punitive damages awarded by the jury and civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable
cases). Federal courts have applied these factors to federal cases under the Fifth Amendment.
Lowry's Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 2d 455, 460 (D. Md. 2004) ("The Gore
guideposts may apply to punitive damages awards under federal statutes.") (citing Cooper
Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 430 n.3 (2001)); Deters v. Equifax Credit
Info. Servs., Inc., 981 F. Supp. 1381, 1389 (D. Kan. 1997) ("The only action at issue in this case
is action by the fderalsystem. Therefore, defendant asks this court to consider a Fifth Amendment
substantive due process challenge."). In discussing due process concerns, this Article does not
discuss whether there should be a difference between the excessiveness inquiry under the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.
19. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (citing BMWof
N. Am., Inc., 517 U.S. at 581).
20. Id.
21. Some of the reasoning in Fxxon supports this latter view. Fxxon Shipping Co., 554 U.S.
at 502 ("And when the bad man's counterparts turn up from time to time, the penalty scheme
they face ought to threaten them with a fair probability of suffering in like degree when they
wreak like damage.").
22. Id. at 514.
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or malicious conduct.', The Court further indicated that it was not a case of
modest economic harm or low odds of detection of the underlying bad
behavior.'4 Cases involving any of these elements do not fit well within a
ratio analysis that relies on a comparison of compensatory to punitive
damages. A strict one-to-one ratio fails in these instances because more
egregious conduct might warrant more punishment, the level of appropriate
punishment sometimes does not correspond to the plaintiffs other
damages, and because a defendant may escape full punishment if the harm
it causes often escapes detection.
Many federal employment discrimination cases in which punitive
damages exceed other damages are likely to have one or more of these
characteristics. First, given the substantive standard for proving intentional
discrimination, the employer or its agent has engaged in conduct that
violates strongly held beliefs about appropriate conduct. Under Title VII
and the ADA, only intentional conduct will result in punitive damages.
Second, the measure of damages in these cases is often back pay, and it
is difficult to argue that a company should be punished less because it
discriminated against a low-wage worker than a higher paid one. It is even
arguable that discriminating against a more economically vulnerable
individual is more reprehensible. In many harassment cases, the plaintiff has
not lost any pay, and a strict ratio between emotional distress damages and
punitive damages may not fully punish the defendant. Finally,
discrimination cases do involve low odds of detection regarding the
underlying behavior, especially given that many employees fear retaliation
and do not complain about discrimination. Overall, discrimination cases are
not generally analogous to the underlying claim in Exxon.
More importantly, Exxon's reasoning is seriously flawed and should be
limited to maritime law, rather than expanded. The Court decided on a one-
to-one ratio because several studies showed that the median ratio of punitive
to compensatory damages awarded by juries was one-to-one. 25 However, this
observation does not account for the possibility that certain kinds of action
might be considered more reprehensible than others or that community
beliefs about reprehensibility might change over time. For example, it is
reasonable that jurors might consider discrimination to be more
reprehensible than a violation of patent law. It also is reasonable to believe
that jurors might believe continued discrimination is more reprehensible
now or in the future, given the clear societal policy against it. Further, just
because juries generally apply a one-to-one ratio does not mean this ratio
should direct the outcome in all cases.
23. Id. at 513.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 512.
29
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More importantly, a court policy to generally apply a one-to-one ratio
under the guise of constitutional due process would seriously undermine the
role of the jury. In general, the jury is better equipped to handle questions
of reprehensibility than a single judge. The jury is likely to be diverse as to
gender and perhaps as to race and age. Further the relative social power and
wealth of judges may make them less able to view conduct through the lens
of an employee who is relatively less powerful than the judge and more
economically vulnerable. Morevoer, in many employment discrimination
cases, the jury has already rejected defenses or affirmative defenses that
would allow the employer to escape liability or to limit it. 26
While it is clear that Exxon does not apply as precedent in federal
employment discrimination cases, courts must use care in invoking it for
other reasons. While the case does stand for the proposition that
constitutional analysis is not required where the underlying regime alleviates
excessiveness concerns, the case's problematic reasoning about the
appropriate level of punitive damages should not be imported into
discrimination law.
III. EMPLOYERS SHOULD FACE DIRECT LIABILITY FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Professor Seiner's Article provides an analysis for courts to use in the
most common kinds of punitive damages cases they will face. In these cases,
the plaintiff establishes the underlying violation of federal law by showing
that an employee engaged in intentionally discriminatory behavior:' Then,
the plaintiff establishes that punitive damages are warranted because the
employee has the requisite malice or reckless indifference to justify punitive
damages. Both of these steps focus on the employee. The final step requires
a showing that it is appropriate to impute liability to the employer.
There are at least two other situations in which the employer should be
liable for punitive damages. In the first, the underlying substantive liability is
created by the employer's own intent. These cases thus involve the
employer's direct liability for both the underlying discrimination and for
punitive damages. In the second scenario, the plaintiff establishes that an
employee engaged in intentionally discriminatory behavior, but bases the
punitive damages liability on the employer's own intent or reckless
indifference. This Part further explains these two possibilities.
Under the first proposal, a jury could award punitive damages against
an employer for its own intentional conduct. The easiest cases involving the
26. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(3) (2006) (indicating that a plaintiff may not receive
punitive damages if the employer made good faith efforts at accommodation under the ADA);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 8o8 (1998) (providing affirmative defense for
employers when it did not take a tangible employment action).
27. The author is not claiming that intent is required to establish discrimination outside
of the disparate impact context. However, punitive damages will only lie in cases involving
intent.
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employer's own intentional conduct are those where the alleged
discriminator is an alter ego of the employer, such as a sole proprietor of a
business or a partner in a traditional partnership. In these instances,
through a legal fiction, the discriminator is said to be acting as the company.
In these cases, punitive damages can be proven without considering the
employer's culpability separate from that of the individual, as long as the
individual's actions constitute intentional discrimination and meet the
required standard for punitive damages.
Pattern or practice cases also often involve the employer's intent. In
these cases, the plaintiff has established that discrimination is an employer's
standard operating procedure. 8 Cases in which the employer had an
explicit or implicit policy of discrimination also could lead to direct liability
for punitive damages.
Outside of these clear cut cases, a court must consider whether
corporate intent exists, even in cases involving individual disparate
treatment. It is crucial that courts not view intent as only stemming from
individual actors, because doing so creates a stunted view of the workplace.
The search for a "rogue" actor diverts courts and litigants from considering
the way that formal and informal processes and policies shape the actions of
individuals within the workplace.29 Further, courts that view liability as
deriving solely from individual actors tend to view the workplace as
operating through discrete and identifiable employment decisions. In many
instances, structural discrimination or group decision-making dynamics
contribute to discrimination.
To be sure, some discrimination cases do stem from rogue actors and
individualized decision making. However, courts considering whether
punitive damages are appropriate should also consider whether the
employer should be penalized for its own acts, and not just derivatively for
the acts of its agents.
Courts can determine corporate intent not only by looking at the
employer's official policies, but whether it engaged in other conduct, such as
rewarding or failing to discipline employees who engaged in past
discriminatory conduct, providing inadequate education about expected
conduct, repeatedly allowing discrimination to continue, ignoring
indications that systemic discrimination exists, and relying on subjective
decisionmaking in light of evidence suggesting it is being used in a
discriminatory manner.
Under a corporate-intent standard, it would be appropriate to
amalgamate the actions of numerous actors, including non-supervisory co-
28. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
29. Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An Otganizaiional Perspecive on
Copotrate Moral Ageny, 33 AM. Bis. L.J. 489, 555 (1996) ("[Olrganizations would not exist




workers. Thus, there are cases when the employer should be held liable for
punitive damages, even when the primary actors are the plaintiffs co-
workers.
In these direct-liability cases, the plaintiff would first be required to
establish intentional discrimination by the employer. The plaintiff would
then be required to demonstrate that the intentional discrimination was
committed with malice or with reckless indifference to the employee's
federally protected rights.o Kolstad suggests that reckless indifference would
be found where the employer acted with subjective consciousness of a risk of
injury with indifference to its obligations:'
In Kolstad, the Court created a defense when the employer engages in
good faith efforts to comply with Title VII.; The affirmative defense created
in Kolstad does not apply in direct liability cases because for the defense to
make sense, it only applies in instances where the plaintiff is seeking to hold
the employer indirectly liable for the acts of its agents.
Employers would also potentially be liable for punitive damages when
the underlying substantive liability is based on employee intent, but where
punitive damages are appropriate because of the employer's malice or
recklessness. The possibility of direct liability for punitive damages in these
instances is specifically recognized by the Restatement (Third) of Agency. In
discussing punitive damages, it notes:
To limit the availability of punitive damages to an individual
employee or agent disregards the possibility that a principal,
especially an organization, may systematically influence the actions
of its employees or other agents but do so in ways that do not
amount to instances of legal fault that a plaintiff could prove. The
availability of punitive damages provides a mechanism to focus
attention at an organizational level on how best to exercise control
over employees and other agents to reduce the risk of harm that
their activities pose to third parties.i;s
In these cases, the employer is being held liable for punitive damages based
on the employer's own failure to control the agent or other fault. The fact-
finder is tasked with assessing whether the employer's "mechanisms of
control have fallen short and the degree to which an agent's tortious
conduct fairly implicates the organization itself."34 This distinction is
important because it allows employers to be liable for punitive damages even
when a managerial employee is acting outside the scope of employment and
in instances when co-workers engage in discriminatory conduct.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006).
t. SeeKolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526, 536 (1999).
32. Id. at 544.
33. RESTATEMENI (TiIlRD) OFAGENCY§ 7.03 cmt. e.
34. Id.
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Take for example, a case in which a plaintiff proves that she was sexually
harassed by a co-worker. The plaintiff also proves that this co-worker
harassed two other co-workers and despite repeated complaints, the
employer failed to stop the harassment. Under the substantive law, an
employer could be held substantively liable for the co-worker harassment if
it "knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take
remedial action."ms After establishing liability, the plaintiff could still try to
hold the employer liable for punitive damages, if it could establish that the
employer acted with malice or reckless indifference to the plaintiffs
protected rights. Allowing repeated harassment by the same supervisor
meets this standard.
It also is necessary to keep in mind an essential problem that occurs
when courts import evolving common law standards into statutory regimes.
In Koistad, the Supreme Court claimed that it was modifying common law
concepts of agency for the employment discrimination context>@ In doing
so, it borrowed ideas from the 1957 Restatement (Second) of Agency.:7
Since Koistad, the Restatement (Third) of Agency has been issued.S As
agency law develops, both employees and employers should be able to argue
that courts should modify Kolstad's underlying premises to reflect modern
understandings of agency.
Professor Seiner's model brings much needed clarity regarding how
courts should analyze vicarious liability for punitive damages, given the
constraints of Koistad and the Supreme Court's recent discussions regarding
due process. Professor Seiner asserts that constitutional limits are
unnecessary in federal discrimination claims, and this statement is an
important contribution. This recognition can save courts from the myriad
conceptual and mathematical mistakes they make when trying to integrate
the complex employment discrimination remedies regime with
constitutional due process tests. By emphasizing the dangers of Exxon and by
providing a way for plaintiffs to hold employers directly liable for punitive
damages, this Essay seeks to strengthen Professor Seiner's worthy project.
35. Malone v. Ameren UE, 646 F.3 d 512, 517 (8th Cir. 201 t) (quoting Tatum v. City of
Berkeley, 408 F.3 d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36. Kobtad, 527 U.S. at 541-42.
37. Id. at 54).
g8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFAG EN(N (2006).
33
